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A MODEST PROPOSAL TO AMEND OHIO'S POST-CONVICTION
COMMITMENT LAW
MICHAEL E. GELTNER*
For over thirty years, Ohio has had a very extensive legal structure
for post-conviction commitment of what has been called, for lack of a
more precise word, the Mentally Deficient Offender.' The Ohio Act,
passed by the General Assembly in 1939, was sponsored by state Senator
Leo M. Ascherman, and was partially based on a study conducted by a
committee of the Cuyahoga County Bar Association.2 Although it has
undergone several amendments, it is popularly known as the Ascherman
Act and will be referred to by that name here. The Act, as it is presently
formulated, can be found in Sections 2947.24 through 2947.29 of the
Ohio Revised Code, and is appended in that form as Appendix A to this
article.
Although the Ascherman Act has often been referred to as a "Sexual
Psychopath" law,3 cursory examination of the sections as they presently
stand indicates that it is not limited, in the offenses covered, to sex offend-
ers, but rather, potentially covers all convicted offenders. Neither is, the
Act limited to "psychopaths," but rather encompasses "psychopathic" of-
fenders, "mentally retarded" offenders and "mentally ill" offenders. The
breadth of coverage can readily be understood by reading the definition of
"psychopathic offender" contained in § 2947.24(B) of the Code.' Since
almost anybody who offends, and especially who recidivates, can at least
arguably be tucked under the "psychopath" rubric as it is defined there,
"Deviant Persons" seems about the best way to describe the targets of the
Ascherman Act.
This article contains a proposal for substantial amendment of the
Ascherman Act in order to bring the statute into line with recent constitu-
tional decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other federal
courts and to create a structure for the act to function more effectively.
In evaluating the proposal or any of its parts, the reader should understand
that it is premised on certain variables, such as the state of medical science,
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
'Language seems to be loaded with many connotations in this area. The Maryland defini-
tion, "Defective Delinquents," seems even worse. See MD. ANN. CODE3 art. 31B (1971).2 Much of the unpublished legislative history of the law is summarized in Simonsen,
Piperno and Allen, A Social-Legal History of Sexual Psychopath Laws and the Development
of The Ohio Statutes (presently unpublished), prepared by The Ohio State University Program
for the Study of Crime and Delinquency (1973).
aId.
4 Different labels have enjoyed popularity in the psychiatric profession from psychopath
to sociopath to anti-social personality and back to sociopath, which seems to be in vogue
at present. Likewise, definitions have fluctuated although it now appears that Cleckley's defini-
tion, which is different from that contained in § 2947.24, is accepted by the psychiatric pro-
fession. See CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANrrY (4th ed. 1964).
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the present capacity of the facilities and staff in existence in Ohio, and
the ways in which bureaucracies function. To the extent that these var-
iables change, the premises leading to specific proposals may change and
alter the viability of the proposals.
This proposal addresses itself primarily to the tension created in the
Ascherman Act by a rather ineffective effort to merge the criminal sen-
tencing process with the mental health commitment process. It is my
view that the merging of the two systems has resulted in persons subjected
to conviction and/or commitment under the Ascherman Act getting the
benefits of neither system but the detriments of both.
Specifically, the sentencing process is characterized by very little in
the way of procedural rights (at least after conviction), but some very
specific substantive rights as to time of release. Thus, one sentenced
for a crime has an absolute right to release when the maximum period
of the sentence has been served and a right to periodic review by an inde-
pendent agency, the parole board, which has the power to order release.
Similarly, one committed to the custody of a mental hospital by the
probate court has some very clear rights. Here the rights are procedural
rather than substantive, i.e., the individual has a right to a finding com-
plying with due process on the facts necessary for the commitment, but
he does not have a substantive right to release, or review for release, at
any time specified by law.
From the individual's point of view, the commitment process gives
procedural rights and the sentencing process gives substantive release date
rights. The Ascherman Act, by merging the two, gives neither to any great
degree. There is little attention paid in the act to a procedurally correct
determination of the facts leading to the commitment. For example, there
is no requirement that the examining physician appear in the court unless
subpoenaed; 5 and, theoretically, the commitment as to any individual is
indeterminate, a condition resulting in no right to release. 6 This proposal
has as its objective divorcing the commitment from the sentencing process
and, thus, giving the individual the benefits of one of the two systems.
The proposed divorcing of the mental health and sentencing systems
will be achieved by limiting the power of the sentencing court-the munic-
ipal courts and the courts of common pleas-to the imposition of the
5See OrIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.25 (Page Supp. 1972) which provides that the
report of the person or body who examined the offender is itself prima facie evidence of
its conclusions even without the direct testimony of the examining physician or psychologist.
At least one court has held that a similar provision is a violation of the sixth amendment
right to confront one's accusers because, unless the examining physician or psychologist is
subpoenaed by defense counsel, the conclusions will not be subject to cross-examination. See
United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cit. 1966).
G This is true even if the individual committed to a mental health facility is receiving
no benefit from the medical treatment available there. See State v. Braggs, 221 N.E.2d 493
(Juv. Ct. 1966). In fact, under the terms of the act, the indeterminate commitment can
be "served" in a prison, OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.25(B) (Page Supp. 1972).
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sentence for the crime and limiting to the probate court the power to
impose an indeterminate commitment. In addition to eliminating the com-
mitment power of the sentencing court, this proposal is designed to create
mechanisms for dealing with the very specific problems of the nature of
treatment, the right to treatment, the right to refuse treatment, etc., which
are a necessary part of the commitment process, and, to the extent that
therapy or "rehabilitation" is attempted in the penal system, a necessary
part of the penal process.
No guarantees are made about the constitutionality of the Ohio system
if the changes proposed are enacted into law. In fact, judicial decision-
making in this area is sufficiently unsettled to make very risky any predic-
tions as to what the courts will decide are the limits of the commitment
powers and process.7 Moreover, whatever constitutional standards are de-
veloped will be tested not only by the state's written law but also by
reference to how it is administered in practice, 8 so that a law apparently
fair on its face, which is administered in a discriminatory manner9 or in
a cruel and unusual manner, 10 will not withstand attack on the latter
grounds. This proposal appears on its face to be consistent with what
is required by recent decisions and should provide a framework for mini-
mizing deprivations of constitutional rights and reconciling the need for
71 have purposely avoided analyzing the case law here, except 6s it bears directly on
a specific problem, on the ground that doing so is a magnus opus which would overwhelm
the limited objectives of this article. The most significant decisions bearing on the issues
considered here include: Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972), reversing,
in part, Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) and Murel v. Baltimore City
Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted respecting the remainder
of Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cit. 1971) as well as the Tippett opinion and
especially the opinion of Judge Sobeloff at 436 F.2d 1159-66 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Mackey v. Procunier, 477
F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973); Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972); Ashe v. Robinson,
450 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Rouse
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cit. 1966); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D
Wis. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373,
and 344 F. Supp. 387 (1972); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W.
2063 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
There are a few articles dealing very effectively with the issues raised, but a definitive
work is still to be written. See, e.g., Schreiber, Indetermindate Therapeutic Incarceration
of Dangerous Criminals: Perspectives and Problems, 56 VA. L. REV. 602 (1970); Wexler,
Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REv. 889 (1972); N. Kittrie, The Right to he Different;
Deviance and Enforced Therapy (1971).8 At the time of this writing, there is pending in federal court in Toledo an extensive
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of many of the provisions of the Asherman Act and
the operation of Lima State Hospital for the Criminally Insane, where the Ohio Department
of Mental Health and Mental Retardation presently incarcerates most persons committed under
the Ascherman Act. See Davis, et al. v. Watkins, No. 73-205 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
9 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
10 See, e.g., Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cit. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'g 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
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OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
freedom of the medical model with the need for restriction of the criminal
law model."
I. ANALYSIS OF THE ASCHERMAN ACT
The Ascherman Act, although not particularly long, is complex. There-
fore included in Appendix B to this article is a path chart which graphi-
cally illustrates the alternatives available at each stage of the Ascherman
Act process.
The Ascherman Act has no role to play until after a judgment of con-
viction for a crime has been entered by a court having criminal jurisdic-
tion.'" After conviction, any individual is subject to the Ascherman Act
for any crime, felony, or misdemeanor, committed in Ohio.'"
The first stage is a referral for diagnostic evaluation ordinarily to the
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation to determine
whether the individual is either psychopathic, mentally ill, or mentally
retarded.14  Referral is mandatory in sex abuse and child abuse cases.' 5
In all other cases of conviction in Ohio courts, referral for examination
11 Some of the ideas leading to this proposal stem from the author's participation in
a series of seminars on the Ascherman Act in 1972 and 1973 sponsored by the Ohio Judicial
Conference and the Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and many
of the other participants have unwittingly shared in the development of the proposal, although
some clearly would disagree with many of the judgments it makes.
12 In the popular mind, of course, "mental deficiency" is usually equated with insanity
as a defense to a criminal charge. In Ohio, as in most places, "mental deficiency" is relevant
at several stages of a criminal proceeding, including competency to stand trial, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2945.38 (Page 1954), insanity as a defense, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39
(Page supp. 1972), and "mental deficiency" after conviction (Ascherman Act. Each leads
to commitment. The Ascherman Act is the only legal basis for commitment after conviction,
although the civil commitment statutes, see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (Page
Supp. 1972); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5125.011 (Page 1970), could serve the same way,
and there appears to be a regular practice in Ohio of administrative transfer from penitentiaries
to mental hospitals of persons convicted, sentenced and never adjudicated to be "mentally
deficient."
For a recognition that the insanity "tests" differ according to which stage the issue comes
up, see Fortune v. Reshetylo, 33 Ohio St. 2d 22, 294 N.E.2d 880 (1973).
13 The Act is silent on whether a municipal ordinance violation is the kind of "misdemeanor"
which could support an Ascherman Act commitment. There is some analogous authority to
support the proposition that it would not, see, e.g., Townsend v. City of Circleville, 78 Ohio
St. 122, 136-37 (1908); [1917] Op. ATTY. GEN., vol. 1., p. 953, but no reported authority
directly in point.
14 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.25 (Page Supp. 1972). An approved psychiatric clinic
or three psychiatrists can also make the diagnosis.
15 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.25 (Page Supp. 1972), listing offenses by section number.
As of January 1, 1974, the effective date of the amendments to the Penal Code in Ohio,
there will be a change in the listings caused by a redefining and renumbering of the substantive
crimes, which will be contained in new § 2947.25(A). The only serious substantive changes
will be the elimination of sodomy as an offense and, therefore, as a basis for mandatory
referral, and the removal of incest as a specific offense. Much of the conduct covered by
the former offense of incest will be included in a new crime, called "gross sexual imposition,"
new § 2907.05, which will not be a mandatory referral offense. Soliciting a minor for
sex, new § 2907.07 and voyeurism, new § 2907.08, as well as child abuse, new § 2919.22,
will be mandatory referral offenses after January 1, 1974.
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is discretionary with the court. 6 If there is a report back to the court
indicating psychopathy, mental retardation, or mental illness, the court,
if it finds the existence of such a condition,'17 has the power to impose
an indeterminate commitment on the individual, 8 which, under present
practice, will be served in the Lima State Hospital for the Criminally In-
sane.' 9 The commitment continues until such time as the Superintendent
of Lima State Hospital decides that the individual has either recovered or
has progressed sufficiently so as to make treatment unnecessary.20 The
individual has no right to institute a review to determine whether or not
the commitment at Lima is necessary or ought to continue, until after
the termination of the maximum sentence for the offense of which he was
originally convicted.2'
For example, one convicted of an offense punishable by 1-20 years im-
prisonment and then committed under the Ascherman Act may not initiate
a judicial or other proceeding, or even a superintendent's review, until
twenty years have passed. Thereafter, he may, through an outside per-
son, initiate a judicial proceeding once a year, at which the court may
order release if it "finds that such person is not then r22 3 mentally ill, a
mentally retarded offender or a psychopathic offender .... .3 Under the
Ascherman Act as it now stands, there is no right to periodic review by an
16The actual standard is "when it has been suggested or appears to the court that such
person is mentally ill, or a mentally retarded offender or a psychopathic offender," OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.25 (Page Supp. 1972).
17 1 have not at this point gone into the hearing procedure to any degree, but it is
important to note that, under the law as presently written, the psychiatric report is itself
prima facie evidence of its conclusions, an apparent violation of the sixth amendment, see
note 5 supra. In addition, § 2947.25 is silent on the standard of proof required for commitment.
There is substantial authority that the fourteenth amendment requires a burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt on the prosecution. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972). At the very best, the equal protection
of the laws analysis of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504 (1972) would require a preponderance standard on the prosecution.
18'The court also retains the power to place the offender on probation despite a finding
of eligibility for commitment. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.25(A) (Page Supp. 1972).
19 Actually, commitment is to "an appropriate institution designated by the [Division of
Forensic Psychiatry of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.]" OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.25(B) (Page Supp. 1972).
20 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.27 (Page Supp. 1972). The actual standard for recom-
mending termination of commitment-"Whenever . . . [the person committed] . . . has
recovered, or his condition appears to have improved to such an extent that he no longer
needs the special custody, care, or treatment of the institution. ... "-is susceptible of an
interpretation which would permit the superintendent to recommend removal from the insti-
tution of persons who cannot be "cured"-treatment "failures"--as well as "cures." There
is some evidence that this practice has been followed in the past as a method of institutional
management.
2 1 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.27 (Page Supp. 1972).
22 For authority that the burden ought to be on the state to justify continuation of commit-
ment rather than on the committed individual to prove "sanity," see Waite v. Jacobs, 475
F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 603 (D.C. Cit. 1970).
23 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.28 (Page Supp. 1972).
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independent agency until after the maximum conceivable time for the
crime is served.24
In the event of a recommendation of termination of the commitment
the court may terminate the commitment if it "finds that the character
of the defendant and his recovery and the circumstances of the case are
such that he is not likely again to engage in an offensive course of con-
duct."25  The court may also refuse termination, despite the superinten-
dent's recommendation, or grant termination and refuse probation, sending
the individual to prison.26  The most significant point, however, is that
the court in most cases does not have the power to order the complete
release of the individual, even if the case is an appropriate one for ending
the commitment. If the offense is non-probationable, and the maximum
term for the offense has not run out, the only alternative available under
the Act is to terminate the commitment and start the running of the prison
term (with credit given for time served at Lima.)' The individual is
thus thrown into the prison system and has a right to release only upon
the granting of parole by the parole board. Without editorializing too
heavily, it seems odd to send a person who has committed a crime to
a mental hospital to be cured of his criminality and then place him in
prison for punishment after the cure has been effected.
The amendments to the criminal code, effective January 1, 1974, exac-
erbate the situation because they make non-probationable almost every in-
dividual likely to be committed under the Ascherman Act.28 Specifically,
24 The recent penal code revision amends this rule to require annual review of each committed
person by the Superintendent and, in the event that in three consecutive annual reviews the
Superintendent fails to recommend termination of commitment, a right to have the "Director
of Mental Hygiene and Correction" appoint a panel of three physicians from outside the
institution to review the Superintendent's determination. New OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2947.271 (A) and (B) (effective March 23, 1973). Significantly, there is no right to trigger
judicial or other extra-departmental review, with the statutory maximum for the offense, un-
reduced by "good time," remaining, the trigger date.
2 5 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.27(A) (Page Supp. 1972).
26 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.27(C) (Page Supp. 1972).
2 7 Actually, since the only alternative available for non-probationable cases is prison, if
the maximum has not been served, the law makes the termination of commitment an administra-
tive, rather than judicial, determination, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.27(B) (Page Supp.
1972). While this approach appears logical, since there are almost no choices to be made,
it ignores the significance of the determination of "non-probationability," which, under the
amended penal code, will be significant.
28Under present OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.04 (Page 1954) there are eight specific
offenses for which probation is precluded. The offenses are murder, arson, burglary of in-
habited dwelling, incest, sodomy, rape without consent, assault with intent to rape, and admin-
istering poison. The new penal code changes its focus in determining ineligibility for proba-
tion from the offense to the offender and is apparently more flexible, New OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2951.02(F) (effective March 23, 1973). Probation will be unavailable for persons
convicted of "aggravated murder or murder," § 2951.02 (F) (1), or for "repeat or dangerous
offender[s]," § 2951.02 (F) (2), or for offenders who committed their offense "while... armed
with a firearm or dangerous ordnance .. ." § 2951.02(F) (3). It seems safe to hazard the
view that non-probationability has in fact been expanded in Ohio.
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dangerous offenders, repeat offenders, and persons who have committed
offenses while using a gun are non-probationable. The definition of a
"dangerous offender" includes, without limitation, a psychopathic individ-
ual.29 Thus most of the Lima population is for all intents and purposes
non-probationable, as evidenced by the grounds of commitment.
In summary it can be seen that the Ascherman Act is not theoretically
consistent. Moreover, after the January 1, 1974 amendments, the legisla-
ture will have come very close to enacting a potential life sentence for
almost all offenders under a selection process which is verbally vague and
has not yet been definitively studied. ° The way out of confinement, like
the way in, is almost standardless.3
Not only does the Ascherman Act fail to safeguard procedural rights
and the right to release on a fixed date, but it also has no specific provision
dealing with the right to treatment, the appropriate methodologies of treat-
ment, and/or the right not to receive treatment. Theoretically the purpose
of an Ascherman Act commitment is said to be therapeutic, rather than
penal, and admittedly there is some effort going on at the Lima "behavior
modification" unit to medically alter propensities toward crime. Nonethe-
less, the Act itself does not require treatment, as evidenced by the provision
permitting the indeterminate sentence to be served at a penal institution
if there is no room available in the mental hospital. Nor does the Ascher-
man Act begin to address itself to the nature of consent, what is appro-
priate consent, who can properly consent, etc. In effect, the Ascherman
Act affords very little to the individual offender.
2 9 New OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(F)(2) (effective January 1, 1974) defines a
"dangerous offender" by reference to new § 2929.01, which sets forth criteria for sentencing.
It is very inclusive:
(B) "Dangerous offender" means a person who has committed an offense, whose
history, character, and condition reveal a substantial risk that he will be a danger to
others, and whose conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive,
or aggressive behavior with heedless indifference to the consequences. "Dangerous
offender" includes, without limitation, psychopathic offender as defined in Section
2947.24 of the Revised Code. (emphasis added)
Actually, the definition of "repeat offender," contained in § 2929.01(A), is almost as
broad and includes any person who has committed a "sex offense," "theft offense" or "offense
of violence" (all defined elsewhere in the penal code), including a misdemeanor, and commits
another offense in the same category.
30 Some tentative steps at studying how the intake process functions have been taken
by the authors of GORDON, SIMONSEN AND ALLEN, A CASE CLOSEUP: THE "UNRELATED
CRIME" AND THE ASCHERMAN Acr, The Ohio State University Program for The Study of
Crime and Delinquency (1973).
The claim that the void for vagueness doctrine is applicable to post-conviction commitment
statute was raised in Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 389 (Md. 1969), which ultimately came
to the Supreme Court, as Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
It was never adjudicated by the Court, however, because the petitioners were released from
custody while the case was pending and the writ of certiorari was dismissed. A similar
claim is raised respecting the Asherman Act in David, et al. v. Watkins, No. 73-205, (N.D.
Ohio 1973).
a1 See A. Piperno, Study of Lima Release Criteria. (unpublished at this date).
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II. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The proposed changes are intended to accord to the individual offender
whatever benefits can be obtained in a mental hospital environment with
the kind of therapeutic treatment offered there, without denying the indi-
vidual the substantive rights available in the sentencing process. Thus,
there would be established a system in which there are parallel treatment
and penal systems existing under coordinate jurisdiction of the Division
of Forensic Psychiatry and the Department of Corrections. The content
of incarceration will differ in each system, but both will guarantee parallel
sentencing rights. In addition, for a very few, special individuals, there
would be provided a separate system of commitment via the probate
court.3 2
The proposed amendments to the Ascherman Act depend on a total
separation of sentencing and commitment power, which is achieved by
denying to the common pleas and the municipal courts the power to enter
an order of indeterminate commitment of individuals before them. This,
of course, marks a drastic change from the Ascherman Act. In the
event that an individual is convicted of a crime, comes before a common
pleas or municipal court for sentencing, and appears to the judge to be
an individual who may be so dangerous, as a result of a mental condition,
that he will constitute a continuing danger to society if released without
subsequent treatment and modification of his mental condition, the com-
mon pleas or municipal court judge will have only one remedy under
the Amendment and that is to refer the individual to the probate court.
Thus, for municipal or common pleas judges, referral to another court
will substitute for the Ascherman Act examination. In effect, the criminal
courts will be limited to imposing on guilty individuals the sentence adopt-
ed by the legislature for the crime of which they were convicted.
The probate court, upon receiving an individual for an examination
from the common pleas or municipal court, will then refer the individual
for a psychiatric evaluation to an approved psychiatric facility in that
county or region. The court will have the power to commit the individual
for a fixed period of time (40 days would appear to be appropriate) for
a psychiatric evaluation. The psychiatric clinic which does the evaluation
will then, after the period of evaluation is terminated, refer the individual
back to the probate court with a report. If the report concludes that
there is, in fact, no basis for believing that the individual is a mentally
dangerous offender, the probate court will refer the individual back to
the common pleas court for sentencing.
If the psychiatric evaluation report indicates that there is reason to
3 2 A path chart for the proposal, isolating each of the decisional stages, is attached as
Appendix C. It is suggested that the reader follow the proposed amendments on this chart
as a means of facilitating understanding of the new structure.
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believe that the individual may be a "dangerous person," the probate court
will then set a date for a commitment hearing. At the hearing the individ-
ual is entitled to be represented by counsel and to be advised of the nature
of the report and given the opportunity to defend, cross-examine, etc. This
will be the only point in the scheme at which an order of indeterminate
commitment may be entered. The standard for commitment at the hear-
ing in the probate court will be that a person, in order to be indefinitely
committed as a dangerous person, must be found, beyond a reasonable
doubt,"3 to be so dangerous to the physical safety of the community that
it is unsafe under present circumstances for such a person to be released
without some modification or improvement in the individual's mental and
behavior patterns.3 4
If there is no finding that the person before the probate court is a
danger to the physical well-being of the community, if released without
improvement of his or her mental condition, as with persons who are
not evaluated to be dangerous by the psychiatrist, the individual is to be
returned to the common pleas or municipal court for imposition of the
normal sentence. If the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the facts
necessary for indefinite commitment, the probate court judge will enter
an order of commitment to a mental hospital (most likely Lima) under
the supervision of the Department of Forensic Psychiatry.
In the event that an individual is subject to indeterminate commitment,
the entry of the order of indeterminate commitment has as an automatic
consequence the -elimination of the penal sentence in the common pleas
or municipal court. Thus the entry of the probate court's order constitutes
a total expungement of the judgment of conviction, the underlying charge,
and any obligation of the individual committed to serve a sentence. As
with the elimination of common pleas and municipal court commitment
power, this provision is a major departure from the present Ascherman
Act and is one of the keys to the functioning of this system. It is my
belief that the structure of the Ascherman Act, placing commitment in
33 At this stage, the only basis for the commitment is predictive. That being so, the
reasonable doubt standard seems more, rather than less, imperative than in a criminal trial.
See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also Murel v.
Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 358 (1972) (opinion of Douglas, J., dissenting
from dismissal of writ of certiorari.)
3 4 As can be seen, the standard proposed is predictive, rather than an incorporation of
an existing medical category, such as psychopath. This can be criticized on the ground that
psychiatrists ordinarily can not safely predict future behavior and, therefore, that they will
be unable to meet the standard. The answer to this criticism is that the sole justification
for indeterminate commitment offered in this scheme is that certain persons will be a specific
danger to the community in the future unless committed. If, as to any person, future dangerous-
ness cannot be conclusively predicted, he should not be committed, but should be sentenced.
The use of medical definitions, such as sociopath, are of interest in this scheme only insofar
as they tell us something about predicted future behavior, because, since we are only incidentally
concerned with medically benefitting the individual, it is only the. prediction we care about.
It seems better to frame the test in terms of the legislative purpose, rather than to obscure
it.
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the hands of the sentencing judge, but not requiring the sentencing judge
to make any decisions which are "costly" to the court or the system, results
in a system or over-commitment of individuals, primarily because commit-
ment is easy and "low cost." Under the probate court scheme the separa-
tion and the "cost," the total elimination of the penal sentence, should
act as a signal to the probate court to commit only those individuals who
truly represent a serious danger to the community as a result of a mental
condition. Presumably the bulk of convicted individuals would remain
in the sentencing process, thus protecting for them the release rights af-
forded by that process. The "cost" will be apparent below when the pro-
visions for termination of commitment are discussed.
Obviously, this scheme has as a concomitant benefit the elimination
of those provisions of the Ascherman Act which result in persons leaving
the mental hospital and going into a prison. A practical problem which
is thereby avoided is the difficulty of transition from the hospital to the
prison atmosphere. The mental hospital, under present circumstances, is
not a violent milieu. Prison usually is and frequently presents a physical
threat to persons coming in from the mental hospital environment. This
scheme would effect a change in that situation.
As is presently the case, the mental hospital would be run by the
Department of Forensic Psychiatry under a superintendent, but the hospital
would be governed by an advisory board, modeled on Section four of the
Maryland statute establishing the Patuxent Institute.3 ' The advisory board
would be composed of certain persons in the community who hold posi-
tions which establish their expertise in this area. The individuals would
include the professor of psychiatry at several university medical schools,
the professor of constitutional or criminal law at several university law
schools in the state and others. The advisory board will have three basic
powers. The first is the absolute power to forbid certain modes of treat-
ment. 6 The advisory board will also have the power to define and recom-
85 M .ANN. CODE, art. 31B, § 4 (Supp. 1970).
36The fact that behavior modification programs will be offered at the institution raises
some fundamental questions. Assuming behavior modification by the state in an institution
is not in itself unconstitutional, and putting aside for the moment the question of what,
if anything, is a proper consent to behavior modification in an institution, certainly some
forms of behavior modification are improper and, possibly, unconstitutional. Cf. Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 and esp. 329-33 (1972) (concurring opinion of Marshall, J.).
See also Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
Assuming behavior modification is to be utilized, it appears likely that what is permissible
in any one place will be dependent on the state of the art nationally and the extent to
which the mode of treatment offered is predominantly conventional, rather than experimental.
See, e.g., Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1973). In view of the increase in investigation of causes of psychopathy, see, e.g., Goldman,
Sociopathy and Diseases of Aronsal, QUADERNI DI CRIMINOLOGICA CLINICA (1972), and
of experimentation with modes of treatment ranging from psychosurgery to aversive therapy,
the standard for propriety will likely be a changing one. A legislative standard, at this
stage, will either provide no restraints or, if effective, have a lock-in effect. Thus, it is proposed
that a board of experts may be the most effective way to defer legislative determination
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mend particular modes of treatment as well as the quality of institutional
care, such recommendations to be made to the Director of Forensic Psy-
chiatry, presumably to be transmitted to the legislature.3 7  Finally the ad-
visory board will have the power to determine appropriate methods for
obtaining consent from individuals whom the superintendent may propose
to subject to various forms of behavior modification. 8  Thus the creation
of permissibility. The Maryland Act, on which this proposal is modeled, seems to limit
its concern to lobotomies, but changing technology seems to warrant expanding the advisory
board concept to all aspects of behavior modification.
A subsidiary question, rarely faced, of what is permissible use of drugs or other intrusiveinterferences with personality or consciousness as a means of maintaining discipline or order
in the institution, will likewise fall under the final jurisdiction of the advisory board.
37 In some contexts, a constitutional or statutory "right to treatment" has been declared,
see, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). There does not, however, appear to be any direct constitutional
source for such a "right." In the context of post-conviction commitment, the issue of "treatment"
usually comes up as the state's rebuttal to the inmate's claim that the incarceration fails to
comply with due process of law, see, e.g., Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.
1971). Treatment is thus not a "right" in itself, but rather offered as an alternative to
traditional criminal rights, an analysis which usually ignores the normal rule that the beneficiary
of the "right" is the proper person to determine whether it should be asserted, see Pay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). An additional problem is that we usually think of "treatment"
as the effort to terminate a deteriorating condition, e.g., antibiotics for pneumonia, or to
stabilize or correct an abnormal state, e.g., setting a broken leg. Behavior modification through
surgery, drugs or therapies aimed at changing the brain, nerves or other aspects of the body
affecting behavior does not quite fit the model, especially if the patient would not be particularly
interested in receiving treatment if he or she were not incarcerated.
It seems preferable to have an advisory board decide what "treatments" should be offered,
rather than declare an abstract right to treatment, especially since serious consideration must
be given to whether there is a right to resist treatment.
38 The issue of what is proper consent is extremely difficult. The normal rules of constitu-
tional law would require consent to be knowing and voluntary and would, in effect, require
the inmate to be informed that he has a right to refuse treatment in order for his waiver
to be of any value. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458(1938). Such an approach, of course, assumes recognition of a right to resist treatment,
without which the question of consent or waiver becomes largely irrelevant. Parenthetically,
it should be noted that the Supreme Court may be in the process of redefining the constitutional
concept of consent to something more akin to acquiescence in some contexts. Compare Schneck-loth v. Bustamonte, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973) with Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543(1968). Assuming the Pay v. Noia standard, requiring intentional relinquishment of a known
right, governs, there remains the problem of whether a person who has been adjudicated
to have a mental condition justifying commitment has the capacity to waive a fundamental
right. There are no easy answers to how much is enough intellectual capacity or, if theinmate lacks it, who is the appropriate person to act in his or her place in deciding to
consent to a mode of treatment which could be resisted.
Finally, assuming capacity, there is serious reason to doubt whether the Pay v. Noia standard
could ever be satisfied when the body seeking the consent also controls the keys to the jail.Under such circumstances it is likely that release is either directly contingent on cooperation
with treatment or is contingent, less directly, on a change of the inmate's mental state, and
the only possibility for change to occur is acquiescence in the treatment offered. In the face of
an active, treatment-oriented administration, the inmate will be hard-put to resist. Cf. Kaimo-
witz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 42 U.S.LW. 2063 (Mich. Cir Ct. 1973).
Finally, moving from the area of constitutional law to the law of torts, it is likely that
a very large amount of information, possibly an amount which would make the treatment
highly unattractive, will have to be conveyed in order to immunize the hospital from tortliability, see, e.g., Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966); Bowers v. Talmage,159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964). See generally Kloss, Consent to Medical Treatment,
5 MEDiciNF, ScBE AND LAw 89 (1965). But cf. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan.
1960).
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of an advisory board is an effort to cope with the conflicts created by
the developing concept that the indeterminately committed individual has
a right to treatment. Hopefully such a board would make decisions on
a regular basis, rather than in sweeping terms as a legislature must, or
in the slow and cumbersome fashion which frequently characterizes litiga-
tion.
For the advisory board to function effectively it will be crucial that
it be manned by individuals possessing specific technical and clinical exper-
tise. It would be disastrous to place on the board typical political ap-
pointees, who have community standing, but no technical expertise. The
advisory board will serve as an adviser to the Department of Forensic Psy-
chiatry, which also has the responsibility for running the mental hospital.
It will not serve as a release agency.
The release agency will be a separate agency called the "Institutional
Board of Review," which is likewise modeled upon the Maryland statute.
Individuals incarcerated pursuant to an indeterminate commitment order
will be accorded the right to periodic review by the Institutional Board
of Review. The Institutional Board of Review will be required to deter-
mine whether or not the conditions and status of the individual which
led to the entry of the commitment order continue to exist. The burden
of proof as to that issue will be on the board to justify commitment. The
individual will be entitled to come before the board for such a reevaluation
on an annual basis. If the board determines the individual has changed
sufficiently so that he no longer poses a serious threat of physical violence
to society, the board may order release. If the board does not order release,
the individual may appeal to the probate court, which' will then have the
power to affirm or reverse the decision of the Institutional Board of Review
(this latter will be an adversary decision), and which may likewise enter
an order terminating the indefinite commitment. Thus, there is a self-
enclosed system with the probate court as the only entry and with the
Institutional Board of Review and the probate court as the two avenues
of egress.
It is important to note that this probate court scheme will serve as
a model for other forms of commitment of individuals fitting in the inter-
stices of the criminal and commitment systems. Specifically, in addition
to Ascherman Act cases, other individuals committed under present law
include persons found incompetent to stand trial, persons acquitted on the
ground of insanity, and persons in the penal system determined by the
prison administration to be in need of the facilities of a mental hospital.
The developing constitutional law is that the involuntary indeterminate
commitment system is the baseline and that an individual must be sub-
jected to a process at least as protected as the indeterminate commitment
One approach to dealing with these questions is to have an advisory board, aware of
the problems, establish standards.
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process when exposed to commitment in one of these other situations.
Thus, the probate court commitment scheme, with its procedural safe-
guards, will ultimately serve as the model for commitment of incompetent
persons, persons acquitted on the ground of insanity, and persons in the
prison system whom prison personnel believe to be in need of indeterm-
inate commitment as a result of a mental condition.4
On the other hand, those individuals who are returned to the common
pleas or municipal court because they were not found beyond a. reasonable
doubt to be the kind of dangerous person requiring commitment will be
subjected to the normal criminal process. Initially the common pleas or
municipal court judge will have to decide whether to impose a prison
sentence or grant probation, in which determination he or she can, of
course, consider the psychiatric evaluation given by the probate court psy-
chiatric evaluation team.
Those individuals upon whom a prison sentence is imposed will go
to an intake evaluation center similar to the intake evaluation center pres-
ently run by the Department of Corrections. The one distinction will
be that where the present system is staffed by corrections people who have
as their primary function determining what the custody/security "needs"
of the individual are, under the new system there will be a second team
at the intake evaluation center, under the supervision of the Division of
Forensic Psychiatry, who will have as their primary function determining
whether or not an individual has a mental condition such that he or she
will benefit from a therapeutic milieu. If the intake evaluation group
finds that an individual ought to be subjected to a therapeutic rather than
a penal milieu because of potential benefits, the individual will then serve
his or her penal sentence in the mental hospital, rather than in a prison.
The mental hospital presumably will be run by the Division of Forensic
Psychiatry and will be subjected to supervision 'by the same advisory board
mentioned previously.4
34 See cases cited in note 7 supra and especially Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
40 While I have not discussed the issue at any length here, it is my view that the "baseline"
commitment scheme is civil commitment consistent with the Constitution, not as it exists in
the statute. In this regard, the Ohio scheme contained in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 5122
(Page 1970) seems to be woefully unconstitutional both in its method of intake, see Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); and in its method of deciding when
commitment terminates, see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
The present and proposed commitment schemes can be most easily compared by placing the
relevant portions of the appendices side-by-side.
41 In effect, there will "be two "routes" through the corrections system, one penal and
one "therapeutic," with the choice to be made by intake evaluators. Obviously, the choice
is significant because of the great differences between the two routes. Accordingly, unless
the intake evaluators have the capability, time, and facilities to function effectively, the system
will be open to the charge that it is arbitrarily and irrationally discriminating.
I have purposely provided that the route, once chosen, must be adhered to, despite the
possibility that persons may go into a therapeutic milieu and, after a time, have full benefit
or prove amenable to no benefit. They could thus clog the system. Thereare several answers.
First, the "full benefit" people will be good candidates for parole and, since parole eligibility
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The individual will have a right to release by an Institutional Board
of Review, which could be the same Institutional Board of Review dis-
cussed earlier. This board will administer a body of aw identical in all
respects to the body of law administered by the parole board for persons
who have gone into prison. All persons released before the maximum
term will become parolees. Parole will remain under the Department
of Corrections. As can be seen, the purpose of this system is ultimately
to afford the possibility of a therapeutic experience to individuals, but main-
tain a parallel system of rights for those individuals. They will thus have
the same right to review for release after passage of their minimum sen-
tence minus any credited time as persons in the prison system are accorded
by the parole board. They will have the same procedural rights available
at the parole baord and will have the same eligibility for release and
the same absolute right to release after the passage of the maximum -term.
Thus there are no substantive rights lost by serving a prison term in a
mental hospital. The mental hospital prisoner will not in effect be a com-
mitted individual. 2
While I believe that this scheme is consistent with the Constitution,
it bears repeating that the "therapeutic" side of the intake evaluation center
has an enormous amount of power because the content of imprisonment
will be different oil both sides. Therefore, the quality, nature, and con-
stitutionality of the scheme depends upon a high quality intake evaluation
will generally be coming much sooner after January 1, 1974, will not clog the system for
long. Second, the people who are not amenable to treatment will constitute a source of
pressure on the intake evaluators--one of the "costs" which will make them be very cautious
in deciding who can benefit from a therapeutic milieu.
Finally, having observed the Ascherman Act in operation and having spoken to numerous
inmates, it has become apparent to me that, when prison administrators can send prisoners
to a mental hospital and mental hospital administrators can send inmates to prison, each
system becomes the other's "club;' the threat which administrators can use to keep inmates
under control. The grass is almost always thought to be less green in the other institutions.
As a result, I have puposely avoided permitting a cross-over from the parallel corrections
systems. Persons assigned to a therapeutic milieu will not cross-over to prison when they
cease to benefit. Prisoners will not cross-over to the mental hospital.
42 One criticism of this scheme is that there may be persons who were not committed
by the probate court who will become eligible for release and who will be known to the
persbnnel of the mental hospital to be dangerous if at large. It can be argued, for example,
that a more accurate prediction of whether an individual is very likely to engage in future
conduct dangerous to the physical well-being of others can be obtained after a lengthy observation
in prison or a mental hospital rather than at the time of adjudication. There are, of course,
grounds to refute this point of view, see, e.g., Kozol, Boucher and Garofolo, The Diagnosis
and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 371 (1972), and it is well
known that prison or institution performance coincides very litte with performance in the
"free world." In addition, maximum sentences for most crimes remain long in Ohio, and
there is little reason to believe that the parole board or the institutional board of review
will act favorably toward somebody whom prison or mental hospital administrators believe is
a~serious danger to society.
The primary reason for avoiding commitment after service of sentence is that, at that
stage, there would be no "cost" involved to the court. Everywhere else in the proposal,
decision-makers have to weigh against an order of commitment or therapeutic treatment the
loss of some other benefit to society, e.g., the prison sentence. At this stage, there is nothing
to weigh against commitment except the interests of the individual charged.
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process. Its efficiency and effectiveness also, of course, will depend upon
an increase in the amount of money and improvement of the quality of
the system run by the Division of Forensic Psychiatry. A further caveat
ought to be added. This proposal contains a rather rigid separation of
the legal concepts involved in sentencing and commitment, but permits
integration of medical and related facilities. Any reintegration of the
legal systems would reintroduce the saame problems which exist now in the
Ascherman Act.
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Appendix A
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE-MENTALLY DEFICIENT
AND PSYCHOPATHIC OFFENDERS
2947.24 Definitions.
Sections 2947.24 to 2947.29, inclusive, of the Revised Code shall be adminis-
tered by the criminal courts in dealing with mentally retarded offenders and psycho-
pathic offenders in cases in which the court finds that the imposition or continued
enforcement of the applicable penal sentence will not afford to the public proper
protection against possible future criminal conduct of such mentally retarded or
psychopathic offenders.
As used in such sections:
(A) "Mentally retarded offender" means any person who is adjudged mentally
retarded, as defined in section 5125.011 of the Revised Code, who exhibits criminal
tendencies and who, by reason thereof, is a menace to the public.
(B) "Psychopathic offender" means any person who is adjudged to have a
psychopathic personality, who exhibits criminal tendencies, and who by reason there-
of is a menace to the public. Psychopathic personality is evidenced by such traits
or characteristics inconsistent with the age of such person, as emotional immaturity
and instability, impulsive, irresponsive, reckless, and unruly acts, excessively self-
centered attitudes, deficient powers of self-discipline, lack of normal capacity to
learn from experience, marked deficiency of moral sense or control.
(C) "Indefinite commitment" means commitment to the department of mental
health and mental retardation, subject to termination only by an order of release
in the manner prescribed in sections 2947.24 to 2947.29, inclusive, of the Re-
vised Code.
(D) "Court" means any court of record in which a mentally retarded offender
or psychopathic offender was convicted of the crime for which he is awaiting
sentence or has been sentenced.
(E) "Psychiatric examiner" or "psychiatrist" means a person licensed to practice
medicine in this state, whose training and experience includes a minimum of five
years in the treatment of mental diseases.
(F) "Psychologist" means a person who has been graduated with the degree
of doctor of science or of philosophy, in psychology from a graduate school of
a university on the approved list of the association of American universities, and
whose training and experience includes a minimum of two years' practice in clinical
psychology after obtaining either of the above degrees.
So far as is practicable, without undue interference with the orderly conduct
of the business of the court, all hearings and other proceedings relating to any
mentally retarded or psychopathic offenders shall be had before the judge who
presided at the trial resulting in the conviction upon which such offender is dealt
with under sections 2947.24 to 2947.29, inclusive, of the Revised Code, if such
judge is still a judge of the court having jurisdiction.
(1972 H 494, eff. 7-12-72. 1969 H 688; 130 v H 430; 125 v 823)
2947.25 Psychiatric examination before sentence; hearing on report of examina-
tion.
After conviction and before sentence, a trial court shall refer for examination
all persons convicted under section 2903.01, 2905.01, 2905.02, 2905.03, 2905.04,
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2905.07, or 2905.44 of the Revised Code, and all persons convicted of abusing,
beating, torturing, starving, or otherwise causing physical injury to a child to the
department of mental health and mental retardation or to a state facility designated
by the department, or to a psychiatric clinic approved by the department, or to
three psychiatrists. Prior to sentence the court may refer for such examination
any person who has been convicted of any felony except murder in the first degree
where mercy has not been recommended, or any misdemeanor when it has been
suggested or appears to the court that such person is mentally ill, or a mentally
retarded offender or a psychopathic offender. Reference to the department, clinic,
or psychiatrists shall be for a period of not more than sixty days.
The department, clinic, or psychiatrists shall make a careful examination of
such person and furnish to the court a report in writing of the finding as to
the mental condition of the person at the time of examination, together with such
recommendations, suggestions, and opinions as may be helpful to the court, which
report shall also contain the names and addresses of the parties making the examina-
tion. Such report is a public record and becomes a part of the files in the case
but shall not be spread at large upon the journal. A certified copy of such report
shall be served upon such person's attorney of record within three days after the
filing thereof with the court, and shall be furnished to such person on his written
request. If any psychiatric examiner or psychologist not on the staff of any such
psychiatric clinic or the department or a state facility designated by the department
is so appointed, the cost thereby incurred shall be determined by the court and
allowed and taxed as costs and paid in the same manner as witness fees in criminal
cases.
The court shall conduct a hearing thereon not earlier than ten nor later than
thirty days after the service of such copies of the report. Both the state and
such person, his guardian, or next friend may appear in person or by counsel
at such hearing, subpoena, examine, and cross-examine the examiners making the
report, regardless of the part of the state in which the examiners may live, and
produce witnesses, both lay and expert, as to the mental condition of such person.
In the event and to the extent that no subpoenas are issued for the examiners
to appear at the hearing, the report or such part of it as was prepared by the
examiners for whom no subpoena was issued is prima-fade evidence.
If upon consideration of such report and such other evidence as is submitted,
the court fnds that such person is mentally ill as defined in section 5122.01 of
the Revised Code and is subject to hospitalization as provided in section 5122.15
of the Revised Code or is a mentally retarded offender or a psychopathic offender
as defined in section 2947.24 of the Revised Code, the court shall enter such
finding on the records and shall either:
(A) Place the defendant on probation under sections 2951.02 to 2951.12,
inclusive, of the Revised Code;
(B) Impose the appropriate sentence for the offense of which the person
was convicted. At the same time the court -hall enter an order of indefinite
commitment of such person to the department of mental health and mental retarda-
tion, during the continuance of which the execution of sentence shall be suspended.
Thereupon such person shall be sent to an appropriate institution designated by
the department. If the department, because of lack of facilities, fails to designate
an appropriate institution, such person shall be sent to the penal institution to
which he would have been sentenced had he not been adjudged mentally ill, a
mentally retarded offender, or a psychopathic offender. Such orders of indefinite
commitment shall show the offense of which such person was convicted and the
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minimum and maximum penalties therefor. Certified copies of said order and
the reports of the examiners, unless submitted by the department, shall be sent
to the department. Every order of indefinite commitment is a final order.
Motions for a new trial, bail, and appeal on questions of law are applicable
to such cases.
Any finding under sections 2947.24 to 2947.29, inclusive, of the Revised Code,
that a person is mentally ill, a mentally retarded offender, or a psychopathic offend-
er, is a final order.
This section shall not apply to teachers punishing children in accordance with
school policy regarding such punishment.
If upon consideration of the report and such other evidence as is submitted,
the court finds that a person convicted under section 2903.01, 2905.01, 2905.02,
2905.03, 2905.04, 2905.07, or 2905.44 of the Revised Code or a person convicted
of abusing, beating, torturing, starving, or otherwise causing physical injury to
a child and who has the care and custody of a child or children is, by reason
of mental condition, unfit, unable, or incapable of properly and adequately caring
for children, the court shall order the child or children removed from the care
and custody of the person found unfit and placed as authorized for the placement
of dependent children under jurisdiction of the court.
(1972 H 494, eff. 7-12-72. 1969 H 688; 132 v S 316; 129 v 1448; 126
v 392; 125 v 823)
2947.26 Postponement of commitment; release.
The court in which any person convicted of a misdemeanor is adjudged a
mentally retarded or psychopathic offender may postpone indefinitely the commit-
ment of the person under such terms as the court deems suitable. At any time
during the period of the postponement of commitment if it appears to the court
that the person is no longer likely to be a menace to the welfare and safety
of the community, the court may adjudge the person no longer a mentally retarded
or psychopathic offender and order his release from the provisions of sections
2947.24 to 2947.29, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
(1969 H 688. Eff. 11-21-69)
2947.27 Recovery or improvement of inmate.
Whenever a person committed under section 2947.25 of the Revised Code
has recovered, or his condition appears to have improved to such an extent that
he no longer needs the special custody, care, or treatment of the institution to
which he was committed, the superintendent of the institution shall report the
facts to the coordinator of forensic psychiatry in writing, who may order further
examination and report of such person. Except for those persons disqualified for
probation under section 2951.04 of the Revised Code, when such person has re-
covered or is sufficiently improved to justify such action, the coordinator shall
certify said report or reports and its findings and recommendations to the court
which tried such person, and such court shall thereupon hold a hearing on such
matter not earlier than ten days nor later than thirty days after the delivery of
such report to the court to determine the proper disposition of the person commited
under section 2947.25 of the Revised Code. Both the state, and such person,
his guardian or next friend, may appear in person or by counsel at such hearing
and each party shall have the right to subpoena, examine, or cross-examine wit-
nesses. After reviewing the findings and recommendations of the coordinator and
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the reports of the superintendent, and after considering the evidence offered at
the hearing and any written report of investigation made by a probation officer
in accordance with section 2951.03 of the Revised Code, the court shall issue
one of the following orders:
(A) Except for those persons disqualified for probation under section 2951.04
of the Revised Code, where the court finds that the character of the defendant
and his recovery and the circumstances of the case are such that he is not likely
again to engage in an offensive course of conduct and that the public good does
not demand or require that the original sentence be carried out, the judge may
suspend the further execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation
in accordance with the provisions of sections 2951.02 to 2951.12, inclusive, of
the Revised Code.
(B) If such person is disqualified for probation under section 2951.04 of
the Revised Code and has recovered or is sufficiently improved to justify such
action, as certified by the coordinator in his report and findings, the coordinator
shall issue an order terminating the person's indefinite commitment. The sentence
which was suspended under section 2947.25 of the Revised Code shall forthwith
go into effect and the person shall be transferred to the appropriate penal or
reformatory institution, together with a certification of the report and findings to
the superintendent thereof, after which he is subject to the jurisdiction of the
court or the adult parole authority. For the purposes of reckoning the eligibility
of such person for parole or discharge, the time of confinement under an order
of indefinite commitment in accordance with section 2947.25 of the Revised Code
shall be counted as time served with good behavior under the applicable sentence.
(C) Where a person has hal the hearing required by this section, been denied
probation by the trial court, and been confined for a period less than the maximum
sentence for the offense of which he was convicted, the trial court shall terminate
the indefinite commitment. The sentence which was suspended under such section
shall forthwith go into effect and the person shall be transferred to the appropriate
penal or reformatory institution, after which he is subject to the jurisdiction of
the court or the adult parole authority. For the purposes of reckoning the eligi-
bility of such person for parole or discharge, the time of confinement under an
order of indefinite commitment in accordance with such section, shall be counted
as time served with good behavior under the applicable sentence.
If such person has been confined for a period equaling or exceeding the maxi-
mum sentence for the offense of which he was convicted, the order shall provide
that the person be placed on trial visit under supervision. If, after a suitable
period of supervision on -trial visit, the director of mental health and mental re-
tardation is satisfied that the person no longer requires supervision, the indefinite
commitment and the sentence suspended under such section shall be terminated
and the person shall be discharged from the legal control and custody of the
department.
(1972 H 494, eff. 7-12-72. 1970 S 272; 132 v S 316, H 1; 125 v 823)
2947.28 Application for release.
At any time after the expiration of a period equivalent to the maximum sen-
tence for the offense of which he was convicted and sentence suspended, any person
committed under section 2947.25 of the Revised Code may make application person-
ally, by counsel, or by guardian or next friend, for his release to the court by
which he was committed. The court shall grant a hearing upon such application,
at which heariig it shall give consideration to reports and recommendations of
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the department of mental health and mental retardation and to such evidence as
the applicant may present. No subsequent application may be heard on behalf
of any person whose application is denied, except by leave of court, within one
year after the date of the last preceding hearing. If, upon any hearing provided
by this section, the court finds that such person is not then mentally ill, a mentally
retarded offender, or a psychopathic offender, the court shall order the department
to discharge such person and the sentence suspended under such section shall be
terminated.
(1972 H 494, eff. 7-12-72. 1969 H 688; 125 v 823)
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Appendix C
FLOW CHART OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE
ASCHERMAN ACT
return to C.P. or M. Ct. all
convicted persons not found





Court refer to probate ct. any con-
victed person who it is sug-
gested will be a continuing













to persons if released unchanged


















release ts parallel; i.e. same # of
reviews, parole elig. at min. minus
jail time & good time, procedural safe-
guards absolute rt to release at
max. minus good time
The primary objective
of this system is to





rights of the criminal
process to the convicted
and the procedural safe-
guards and review rights












doubt to be "dan- evaluation
gerous persons" on a county
committed indefi- or regional
nitely; conviction basis











bd. with resort to
probate ct for appeal
from negative re-
lease decisions
of Bd.
advisory bd
modeled on Md.
statute; power to
forbid modes of
treatment and de-
fine & recommend
modes of treatment
& quality of
institution
19731

